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The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans
James T. O'Hare*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic rise in interest rates in the United States in the
past few years has given added significance to the uncertain tax
consequences of interest-free loans made between family members,
between corporations and shareholders, and between affiliated corporations. Such loans can create a variety of tax problems depending on the relationship of the parties. An interest-free loan from one
family member to another may constitute a gift equal in value to
the use of the money loaned or even to the amount of the entire
principal. A corporation that makes an interest-free loan to one of
its shareholders not only risks the imposition of a constructive dividend on the shareholder in an amount equal to the value of the use
of the money loaned, but also marks itself as an attractive candidate
for imposition of the accumulated earnings tax since it apparently
has little need for productive employment of the funds in its own
business.' Furthermore, interest-free loans between affiliated corporations may cause the Commissioner to invoke his authority under
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code 2 to reallocate gross income,
deductions, credits and allowances among the corporations involved
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect income. The
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A. 1963, J.D.
1965, Vanderbilt University.
1. Sections 531 to 537 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 impose the accumulated
earnings tax on the accumulated taxable income of every corporation formed or availed of
for the purpose of avoiding income tax with respect to its shareholders by permitting earnings
and profits to accumulate instead of being distributed. Section 533 provides that the fact that
earnings and profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
is determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to its shareholders unless
the corporation proves the contrary. Most accumulated earnings tax cases, therefore, turn on
whether the company's earnings and profits were accumulated for the reasonable needs of
its business. In addition, in computing the accumulated earnings subject to tax a credit is
provided for earnings accumulated for the reasonable needs of the business. See B. BrrIKER
& J. EumScsC,

1971).
2.

FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATIONS

%8.03 (3d ed.

Citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise noted.

1085

1086

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

specific adjustments that must be made in the case of an interestfree loan between commonly controlled corporations 3 are detailed in
the regulations promulgated under section 482 and have been the
subject of extensive litigation in recent years. 4 It is the purpose of
this article to explore the tax treatment of interest-free loans in
these various situations.
II.

INTEREST-FREE LoANs BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS

The tax treatment of interest-free loans between family members has generated surprisingly little attention or litigation. In the
1966 decision of Johnson v. United States,' a Texas federal district
court held that the taxpayers, husband and wife, did not make
taxable gifts of the value of the use of money loaned to their childern
interest-free. Surprisingly, the government did not appeal the decision and it is also remarkable that no subsequent decisions have
arisen on the same point. Johnson has received little attention by
commentators,6 and after seven years the Internal Revenue Service
has announced in Revenue Ruling 73-617 that it will not follow the
court's decision in the case. The failure of the case to attract any
significant attention is surprising since Johnson represents a significant tax planning opportunity. Under Johnson, an interest-free loan
may have tax advantages over a short-term trust. At a time when
historically high interest rates have raised the stakes both to taxpayers and to the government, Johnson and Revenue Ruling 73-61
deserve careful study.
In Johnson, the taxpayers had made large interest-free demand
loans to their children for more than eleven years. With a minor
exception, all of the loans were repaid in 1962 prior to Mr. Johnson's
death. Thereafter, the Service assessed and collected gift taxes from
Mrs. Johnson and her husband's estate for the years 1959-62. Although it was stipulated in the refund suit that the loans were bona
fide, the Service claimed that the taxpayers had made gifts to their
children of the value of the use of the money loaned equal to 3 1/2
percent per annum on the average unpaid balance each year. In
refusing to find that the taxpayers had made such a gift, the district
court noted that the issue was one of first impression, stating:
There is nothing about this transaction that defeats the purpose of the gift
3.
4.
5.
6.
L. REv.
7.

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (1968).
See cases discussed in notes 41-67 infra and accompanying text.
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
The decision was criticized in case comments shortly after it appeared. 5 HousTON
138 (1967); 65 MICH. L. REV. 1014 (1967); 19 STANFORD L. Ray. 870 (1967).
1973 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 5, at 15.
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tax laws. . . to prevent a person from evading estate taxes through reduction
of his estate by inter vivos gifts. The parents were under no duty to lend or
otherwise invest their money. They had a right to keep it in cash. These loans
were conceded to be genuine. Most of them had been repaid before the father's
death. The unpaid amount of the loans appeared on the books, and was includable as an asset of his estate in arriving at the amount of his estate taxes.
The right to interest must arise from an express or implied contractual
obligation or from statute. There was no express or statutory duty on the part
of the children to pay their parents interest ...
The time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal at arm's
length with his children when they finish their education and start out in life.
There is no legal requirement, express or implied, to charge them interest on
money advanced to them at that stage, whether it be to open a law office and
hang out a shingle, to go into the oil business on a substantial scale, or to begin
life on their own in some other way.8

In Revenue Ruling 73-611 the Service announced that it would
not follow the Johnson decision. In that ruling a parent borrowed
200,000 dollars from a bank and later in the same month loaned
250,000 dollars to his son's wholly-owned corporation, receiving in
return two noninterest-bearing corporate notes. The first note was
in the amount of 50,000 dollars, payable at the end of ten years; the
second was a demand note in the amount of 200,000 dollars.
The ruling states that a transfer by gift to a corporation normally represents a gift to the shareholders, with a gift arising when
property is transferred for less than adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth. The right to use property-in this case
money-is described as an interest in property which results in a gift
when transferred without adequate consideration. Consequently, a
gift tax is imposed on the value of the right to use money, normally
stated in terms of interest.
In support of its conclusion, Revenue Ruling 73-61 relies on the
Tax Court decision in Gertrude H. Blackburn." There the court
held that the taxpayer made a gift in the transfer of real property
to her childern in exchange for a note bearing interest at a rate of
only 2 1/ percent per annum when the market rate of interest for
debt obligations secured by real estate at the time was four percent
per annum. The court held it was proper for the Commissioner to
discount the note from its face value because of its lower rate of
interest and to treat the amount of the discount as a gift made by
the taxpayer to her children.
In the case of the term loan of 50,000 dollars, Revenue Ruling
73-61 further holds that a gift equal in value to the right to use the
8. 254 F. Supp. at 77.
9. 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 15.
10. 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
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money for the term of the loan has been made at the time the loan
is granted. In comparison, a gift is made in each quarter in which
the 200,000-dollar demand loan is outstanding, with the amount of
the gift equal to the value of the use of the money for such portion
of the year as the funds are used by the borrower before repayment.
Finally, the ruling notes as a practical matter that a taxable gift will
not arise in the case of most small interest-free loans because of the
availability of the annual 3,000-dollar exclusion per donee and the
30,000-dollar lifetime exemption under the gift tax provisions of the
Code. 1
It is difficult to accept the conclusion of the Johnson case that
an interest-free loan is not a gift of the value of the use of the money
loaned. Under the gift tax laws, a gift occurs when there is a transfer
of property for less than adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth. 2 A transfer of money in return for a promissory
note that provides only for the payment of principal at a future date
without interest results in an unequal exchange. The interest-free
note is worth less than the amount of principal loaned, because a
dollar received at once is worth more than a dollar to be received at
some date in the future.13 Therefore, the interest-free note should be
discounted from its face value with the discount representing the
amount of the gift. It is impossible, however, to determine the appropriate discount on an interest-free demand note at the time the
loan is made since it is not known how long the debt will remain
outstanding. It can clearly be seen that as long as the lender permits
the loan to remain outstanding he accepts less than equal value for
the money he has transferred to the borrower and thereby makes a
gift; the amount of such a "discount" will increase in proportion to
the length of time the demand loan remains unpaid.
The necessity of including the principal amount of a demand
loan in the estate of the lender and the right of parents to make
interest-free loans to their children cited by the court in Johnsondo
not conflict with the finding of a gift. The estate of the lender has
been effectively diminished by the lack of return of the money
loaned and the parent's right to benefit his childern is consistent
with the making of a gift.
Revenue Ruling 73-61 may be correct in its conclusion that an
interest-free loan between family members is a gift of the value of
11. Section 2503(b) provides for an annual exclusion of $3,000, while the $30,000 lifetime exemption is contained in § 2521.
12. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2512(b).
13. See E. HELFERT, TECHNIQUES OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 108-21 (1972) for a discussion
of the time value of money.
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the use of the money, but the ruling leaves substantial uncertainty
in determining the amount of the gift. In Johnson the government
valued the gift by using 31/2 percent interest per annum on the
money loaned as provided in the regulations governing the valuation
of life estates, term interests, remainders, and reversions transferred
on or before December 31, 1970.11 Revenue Ruling 73-61 states,
"[tihe rate of interest that would represent full and adequate consideration may vary, depending upon the actual circumstances pertaining to the transaction."' 5 In the case of the term loan the ruling
states that "the value of the right to the use of the money loaned is
ascertainable by accepted actuarial methods, as of the date the
money and the note were exchanged, and is, therefore, subject to the
gift tax at that time. See section 25.2512-5 of the regulations.",8
The ruling fails to indicate whether the amount of the gift is
determined by reference to the market rate of interest prevailing at
the time of the loan or by application of the tables in the regulations. Moreover, the reference to section 25.2512-5 of the regulations
to ascertain the value of the right to the use of the money loaned
creates additional confusion, since that section contains tables
based on 3 /2 percent per annum interest for valuation of an interest
transferred on or before December 31, 1970. It is unclear why the
ruling refers to the section containing the old tables instead of section 25.2512-9, which contains the tables using six percent per
annum interest for valuing transfers made after December 31, 1970.
Futhermore, in the situation described in Revenue Ruling 73-61 it
might be more appropriate to treat the interest paid by the parent
in the 200,000-dollar bank loan he obtained as the amount of the gift
to his son on the interest-free demand loan of 200,000 dollars, assuming that the proceeds of the bank loan were reloaned to the son
interest-free.
If, instead of employing the three percent or six percent interest
rates, the gift is valued according to market rates of interest on
arm's-length loans, there will be substantial uncertainty about the
amount of the gift. Judged by arm's-length standards, an unsecured
demand or term loan from a parent to his child might require the
use of a very substantial rate of interest. Under current market
conditions, a standard unsecured loan might require an interest rate
of eighteen percent or more. Further an unsecured interest-free term
loan could require a valuation discount of over fifty percent of the
14 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 367.
15. 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 5, at 15.
16. Id. at 16.

1090

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

face amount of the note. Moreover, what role state usury laws
should play in valuing the discount using arm's-length standards is
uncertain. If the normal interest rate for an unsecured loan is eighteen percent per annum, may the gift be measured by that rate even
though the maximum legal rate of interest to the individual under
state law is twelve percent? What interest rate should be imputed
to the loan if an arm's-length lender would not make an unsecured
loan to the borrower under any circumstances? It may be one thing
to measure the value of the gift by reference to the standard of the
shylock,'7 but quite another to use the rate of the loan sharks.
An alternative suggestion is to use the income actually produced by the loan as the amount of the gift. 8 This standard of
valuation has the advantage of including in the gift the full amount
of any income received by the donee from the loan. On the other
hand, such an approach raises the problem of tracing the amount
of income derived from the loan proceeds. Ascertaining the income
arising from the borrowed funds might be simple when the borrower
has purchased bonds with the loan proceeds but impossibly complex
in cases where he has invested the proceeds in his business enterprise. Furthermore, if the loan proceeds were traced to unproductive
investments, a gift would be precluded.
Employing a flat six percent per annum interest rate for valuing
the amount of a gift resulting from an interest-free loan is consistent
with the present method of valuation of other interests requiring a
rate of return assumption'9 and also provides a more certain basis
for measuring the gift. A degree of gift tax avoidance, however, can
be achieved under this valuation method if interest rates remain
above six percent on money market investments. For example, an
interest-free loan of 100,000 dollars may be invested by a borrower
in corporate bonds yielding in excess of nine percent currently."' If
the lender is considered to have made a gift of only six percent of
100,000 dollars, or 6,000 dollars, while the borrower has been able
to produce 9,000 dollars of income on the investment of the loan
17. "I hate him for he. . . lends out money gratis and brings down the rate of usance
here with us in Venice. If I can catch him once upon the hip I will feed fat the ancient grudge
I bear him. . . . [Hie rails, even there where merchants most do congregate, on me, my
bargains, and my well-won thrift, which he calls interest." Win. Shakespeare, The Merchant
of Venice, Act I, sc. iii (G.B. Harrison, ed., 1968).
18. This approach may be required when the donor is taxable on the income produced
by the loan under assignment of income principles. See notes 26-29 infra and accompanying
text.
19. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1956).
20. In September 1974 single A rated bonds were offered at yields of over 10%. See, e.g.,
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1974, at 19.
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proceeds, an economic benefit given to the borrower has not been
subjected to the gift tax. This result is possible because the regulations valuing interest-which depend upon a rate of return assumption-are outdated under current market conditions since they are
based on a low rate of six percent. The Treasury may be expected
to revise the regulations in this regard if interest rates remain at
current levels.
A loan between family members often raises the question
whether the borrower actually intends to repay the amount
"loaned." If a bona fide indebtedness is not created or maintained,
a gift of the principal amount of the loan results. 2' Depending upon
when the intent that the "loan" need not be repaid arises, the gift
results either when the "loan" is initially made or later when the
indebtedness is forgiven.
A provision for interest is almost always accepted as a principal
feature of genuine indebtedness. 22 Thus, when an interest-free demand loan remains outstanding year after year with no repayments
of principal it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that genuine
indebtedness does not exist and that the gift tax should be imposed
on the entire principal amount of the "loan." A family lender may
initially make a loan with the intent that it be repaid but subsequently find that losses of the borrower require a different approach.
Parents who loan their children substantial sums that are lost in
bad investments originally may have intended to create genuine
indebtedness but may later be forced to choose between sending
their children into bankruptcy court or making a substantial gift by
forgiving the indebtedness. If the borrower has lost the ability to
repay the loan, a decision to allow the loan to remain uncollected
for a substantial period of time nevertheless indicates that the once
genuine indebtedness has been forgiven.
The tax consequences of interest-free loans and short-term
trusts are interesting to compare. A grantor who creates a revocable
trust or one in which the property will revert to him in less than ten
years is treated as the owner of the trust property for income tax
purposes and is taxed on the income of the trust. 23 In addition, the
21. It has often been said that a loan to a family member is presumed to be a gift. See
Estate of Pearl Gibbons Reynolds, 55 T.C. 172 (1970). Frequently, the question arises in the
context of a bad debt deduction sought by the lender. The courts often conclude that a gift
rather than a loan was intended. See, e.g., Estate of Carr, 12 T.C. 1158 (1949); C.B. Hayes,
17 B.T.A. 86 (1929).
22. The fact that a note does not bear interest has been held to be evidence of a gift.
See, e.g., Elizabeth N. Rude, 48 T.C. 165 (1967).
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 676 (revocable trusts). Section 673 provides that the
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grantor is subject to the gift tax on the term interest of the shortterm trust and on income of the revocable trust that is received by
the beneficiary prior to revocation.2 If instead, the grantor creates
an irrevocable trust with a minimum duration of ten years, he will
not be taxable on the income of the trust,2s but the value of the term
interest created in the beneficiary will still be subject to the gift
tax. 21 In contrast, a taxpayer who makes an interest-free loan may
retain the power to reacquire his funds on demand or at the end of
a short term without subjecting himself to the income and gift taxes
on the return produced by the funds loaned to his borrower, who
retains all of the income on the investment of the loan proceeds.
Income from such investment is taxable to the borrower, and under
Johnsonthe lender has not made a gift. Even if Johnson is incorrect,
interest-free loans may have the advantage over a short-term trust
of permitting the taxpayer to avoid income taxation on the income
produced by the funds.
There are situations, however, in which an interest-free loan
will not be an appropriate substitute for a revocable or short-term
trust. For example, an interest-free loan to a minor would probably
not be appropriate because the borrower should be of legal age to
enter into contracts in order to establish a bona fide indebtedness.
In addition, the taxpayer might not be willing to entrust the family
member with responsibility for investing a substantial amount of
money. In such case, the transfer of funds to a trustee with investment expertise may be the better alternative. An interest-free demand loan to fund a trust would probably be treated as a revocable
trust.
While the income produced by borrowed funds is normally
taxed to the borrower, it is arguable that the income arising from
an interest-free loan should be taxed to the lender through the application of the assignment of income doctrine. This would result in
tax treatment equivalent to that of a revocable or short-term trust.
grantor will be treated as the owner of any interest in a trust that will or may reasonably be
expected to take effect in possession or enjoyment within 10 years of the transfer of that
portion of the trust. Under subsection 673(c), however, the grantor is not treated as the owner
of an interest that will not take effect in possession or enjoyment until after the death of the
person to whom the income from the trust is payable.
24. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(e), -2(f) (1956).
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671, 673. This assumes, of course, that the provisions of
the trust instrument do not run afoul of any other of the grantor trust provisions, such as §
674, which deals with the power to control beneficial enjoyment of corpus or income. Also, as
noted in footnote 23, if the trust income is payable to the beneficiary for life, the grantor will
not be taxed on the income even though the beneficiary has a life expectancy of less than 10
years.
26. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1956).
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Even when interest-free loans are payable on demand or are for a
short term, they are not embraced by the grantor trust provisions
of the Code. 2 The history of those provisions taxing the grantor on
the income of the trust as the substantial owner of the trust property, however, may support application of the assignment of income
doctrine to interest-free loans. In Corliss v. Bowers,28 the Supreme
Court upheld the power of Congress to treat the grantor of a revocable trust as the owner of the trust property and as such to tax him
on the income of the trust. On the basis of general income tax
principles, the Supreme Court held in Helvering v. Clifford29 that a
taxpayer who had created a trust with himself as trustee for a fiveyear term for the benefit of his wife was taxable on the income of
the trust as the substantial owner of the trust property. These two
cases concerning grantor trusts indicate that courts might treat a
taxpayer who has loaned money interest-free to a family member as
the substantial owner of the loaned funds, authorizing the Service
to tax him on the income produced by the loan. Additional justification for such treatment would exist if the lender obtained a security
interest in property purchased with the loan and had or exercised
control over the use made of the loaned funds. Moreover, taxing the
lender on the income produced by the loan might provide a basis
for imposing gift tax liability on the amount of income received by
the borrower.
Conversely, failure to tax the lender on income produced by the
interest-free loan might result in that income escaping income taxation altogether. If income produced by the loan is treated as a gift,
the borrower may contend that it is therefore excludable from his
own income.3 0 Unless the income is then taxed to the lender on
assignment of income principles it may not be subjected to the
taxation at all. In order to avoid this peculiar result it may be
27. Part I [of Subchapter J] has no application to any organization which is not to be
classified for tax purposes as a trust under the classification rules of §§ 301.7701-2, 301.77013, 301.7701-4. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(a) (1954). "Generally speaking, an arrangement
will be treated as a trust under the Internal Revenue Code if it can be shown that the purpose
of the arrangement is to vest in trustees responsibility for the protection and conservation of
property for beneficiaries who cannot share in the discharge of this responsibility and, therefore, are not associates in a joint enterprise for the conduct of business for profit." Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-4(a) (1954) (Ordinary Trusts).
28. 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
29. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
30. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102. Of course, while the definition of the term "gift" is
not the same for purposes of income tax exclusion as for gift tax purposes, nevertheless, the
donative intent on the part of the lender-donor required for the income tax exclusion is
present in the interest-free family loan.

1094

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

necessary to apply the assignment of income doctrine to assure income taxation of income produced by the loan.
Ill.

INTEREST-FREE CORPORATE LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS

In J. Simpson Dean,3 ' the taxpayers, husband and wife, received substantial loans of money from their controlled corporation
in exchange for interest-free notes. The Commissioner contended
that the taxpayers realized income to the extent of the economic
benefit derived from the use of the money borrowed interest-free.
Rejecting the Service's arguments, the Tax Court held that the
borrowers did not realize income from the interest-free corporate
loans. The majority opinion reasoned as follows:
In support of its present position, the Government relies primarily upon
a series of cases holding that rent-free use of corporate property by a stockholder or officer may result in the realization of income. . . .These cases bear
a superficial resemblance to the present case, but reflection convinces us that
they are not in point. In each of them a benefit was conferred upon the stockholder or officer in circumstances such that had the stockholder or officer
undertaken to procure the same benefit by an expenditure of money such
expenditure would not have been deductible by him. Here on the other hand,
had petitioners borrowed the funds in question on interest bearing notes, their
payment of interest would have been fully deductible by them under section
163, I.R.C. 1954. Not only would they not be charged with the additional
income in controversy herein, but they would have a deduction equal to that
very amount. We think this circumstance differentiates the various cases relied upon by the Commissioner, and perhaps explains why he has apparently
never taken this position in any prior case.3"

In a concurring opinion, four judges took the position that it
was unnecessary to decide whether an interest-free loan resulted in
income to the borrower. In their view, if the interest-free loan did
result in income to the borrower, "the corresponding interest deduction would perhaps exactly offset and nullify it," 3 and consequently
no deficiency would result.
One member of the court dissented, arguing that an interestfree loan to a shareholder does result in income; consequently, the
dissent stated that in order to escape taxation the shareholder must
plead and prove that he would have been entitled to an interest
deduction that would not be barred by section 265(2)'s prohibition
on using the loan proceeds to purchase or carry tax-free bonds. Since
the taxpayers did not plead or prove these matters, the dissent
would have sustained the deficiency.
31. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
32. Id. at 1089-90.
33. Id. at 1090.
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Although the government did not appeal Dean, it waited twelve
years to announce its nonacquiescence 4 The Service's rejection of
the result in Dean indicates that the issue deserves further examination.
When a corporation confers an economic benefit on a shareholder the usual result is dividend income, provided the company
has sufficient earnings and profits. 5 The rent-free use of corporate
property by shareholders is a common example of an indirect dividend payment.3 6 No real economic difference exists between a shareholder's rent-free use of tangible corporate property and the same
shareholder's interest-free use of corporate funds. In both cases an
economic benefit is conferred upon the shareholder by the corporation and dividend income results. The Dean case, however, suggests
a distinction in the net result of the two cases based upon the interest deduction a shareholder would have if he paid interest to the
corporation. Although the shareholder may have dividend income
as a result of the interest-free loan, under the rationale of the opinion in Dean he has a corresponding interest deduction that prevents
an increase in his net income.
Despite this line of reasoning articulated in Dean, it is not clear
that a shareholder is entitled to an interest deduction for interest
he has not paid. Section 163 allows an interest deduction for "all
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
(Emphasis added). A shareholder with an interest-free corporate
loan does not pay or accrue interest on it. Moreover, a conflict with
the Dean rationale is found in a number of cases holding that a
borrower has no interest deduction on an interest-free loan. 7 If
the taxpayer had paid interest on the indebtedness, the corporation
would have reported interest income on the loan. In the case of an
interest-free loan the corporation does not report interest income
that it did not receive,3 8 and the shareholder should not be permitted to deduct interest expense that was not paid. An interest-free
loan is not the same as an interest-bearing loan to a shareholder
with an accompanying cash dividend to use for the payment of
34. 1973 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 51, at 7.
35. The existence of sufficient earnings and profits to cover an actual or constructive
distribution of a dividend is assumed in the following discussion.
36. See, e.g., 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952); International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970).
37. See D. Loveman & Son Export Corp., 34 T.C. 776 (1960); Howell Turpentine Co.,
6 T.C. 364 (1946); Rainbow Gasoline Corp., 31 B.T.A. 1050 (1935); A. Backus, Jr. & Sons, 6
B.T.A. 590 (1927).
38. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960); Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C.
304 (1952); Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940).
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interest to the corporation: in the former case the corporation has
paid a constructive dividend, but receives no income itself, while in
the latter case the corporation has paid an actual dividend and
earns interest income on the loan.
The government is probably correct in refusing to follow the
decision in Dean. An interest-free loan by a corporation to a shareholder produces dividend income that should not be offset by an
interest deduction for unpaid interest not reported as income by the
corporation. If the corporation does charge a shareholder interest on
a loan, then no dividend results, the shareholder receives a deduction for interest paid to the corporation, and the corporation reports
the interest income received-a result that accords with economic
reality.
Still other dangers are created by interest-free loans to shareholders. If no bona fide debt obligation exists, there may be a dividend distribution by the corporation in the full amount of the loan.39
The problem is aggravated by the absence of a provision for interest
on the loan, a principal feature found in genuine indebtedness."
Finally, an interest-free loan to shareholders may strengthen the
case for imposition of the accumulated earnings tax. A corporation
with adequate funds to loan to its shareholders demonstrates that
it does not need to employ the funds in its business and probably
has the financial ability to distribute the money loaned as dividends. If the loans to shareholders are interest-free, the corporation's ability to do without the productive use of its funds is spotlighted and the case for concluding that it has retained earnings
beyond the reasonable needs of its business is fortified."
IV.

INTEREST-FREE

LOANS

BETWEEN

COMMONLY

CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS

Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Commissioner to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances among two or more commonly owned or
39. See BrITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 1, 7.05, at 7-26; Werner, Stockholder Withdrawals-Loansor Dividends? 10 TAX L. REv. 569 (1955).
40. In many cases holding that a purported "loan" by a corporation to its shareholder
was a dividend distribution, the lack of interest on the "loan" has been cited as a factor in
determining that the indebtedness was not genuine. See Myer v. Commissioner, 383 F.2d 883
(8th Cir. 1967); Roschuni v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1959), affg 29 T.C. 1193
(1958); Niederkrome v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1958); Christopher v. Burnet,
55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
41. The issue whether earnings have been accumulated beyond the reasonable needs
of the business is often determinative in an accumulated earnings tax case. See note 1 supra.

1974]

1097

TAXATION OF LOANS

controlled entities if he determines such action is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect income clearly. The regulations
under section 482 are based on the premise that transactions between controlled entities should adhere to an arm's-length standard,42 and require adjustments, where necessary, to equate the tax
consequences of such transactions with those that would obtain as
the result of independent bargaining.
This arm's-length standard is reflected in the regulations43 pertaining to loans between controlled corporations. If the rate of interest charged is more or less than that which would have been charged
between independent parties, an adjustment is required in the interest income of the lender and in the interest deduction of the
borrower. Unless the lender is engaged in the lending business, generally the rate of interest charged on a loan between commonly
controlled corporations will not be adjusted if it is not less than four
nor more than six percent. In cases in which the loan represents the
proceeds of a loan obtained by the lender at the situs of the borrower, however, the rate will be adjusted to the rate paid by the
lender on the primary loan. If the market rate is less than four
percent, the lender may charge less than four percent but not less
than the market rate, while if the market rate is greater than six
percent he may charge more than six percent but not more than the
market rate. When the transaction requires an adjustment, however, the rate of interest will be adjusted to five percent per annum.
The validity of the regulations summarized above has been
challenged in recent litigation, with primary emphasis on the "creation of income" issue. Modern litigation on this issue begins in 1940
with the case of Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,,
in which a brother corporation leased equipment rent-free to its
sister company. The Commissioner increased the income of the
brother corporation by the amount of rent that would have been
charged in an arm's-length lease, but did not reduce the income of
the sister corporation by the rent that would have been paid. The
Sixth Circuit held that the Commissioner had not allocated income,
but instead had "set up income where none existed.

Bridgeman &

Co.,4"

' 45

In Smith-

the Tax Court relied on Tennessee-Arkansas

42. "The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer
dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1)
(1962).
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (1968).
44. 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
45. Id. at 510.

46. 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acq. 1951-1 CUM. BULL. 3.
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Gravel Co. in upsetting the Commissioner's imputation of interest
income to a subsidiary on interest-free loans to its parent. The court
stated that the predecessor section of section 482 did not authorize
"the creation of income out of a transaction where no income was
realized by any of the commonly controlled businesses. 4 7 No allocation of income was made "since the record shows that [the Commissioner] made no adjustment to the income or deductions of [the
parent]."48
Although the Service acquiesced in Smith-Bridgeman, it later
clarified its position in Revenue Ruling 67-79,11 explaining that its
acquiescence was intended only to connote agreement that when
interest income is imputed to the lending corporation, the income
of the borrowing corporation must be correspondingly reduced in
order to allocate gross income properly under section 482.
The Tax Court's position was amplified in its decisions in
Huber Homes, Inc.-" and PPGIndustries, Inc.5" In Huber Homes, a
parent company sold homes to a subsidiary at a price that was less
than fair market value. Rather than reselling the homes, the subsidiary rented them to third parties. The Commissioner increased the
parent's income by the difference between the sale price of the
homes and their fair market value while making a corresponding
adjustment to the basis of the homes in the hands of the subsidiary.
None of the rental income from the homes, however, was allocated
to the parent. Although in this instance the Commissioner had adjusted the income of both corporations, the Tax Court found the
adjustments improper, stating that "even in light of this adjustment
income is being attributed to petitioner that was not in fact realized
by the controlled group."5 Since the court held that section 482 was
not applicable, it did not reach the taxpayer's argument that the
excess of the fair market value of the houses transferred to the
subsidiary should be treated as a tax-free contribution to capital
under section 118.
In PPG Industries, Inc. 53 the Tax Court held that interest income could not be allocated to a parent on interest-free loans to a
subsidiary when no income was derived by the subsidiary on the
loans. In the view of the Tax Court, only when income is derived
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 293.
Id. at 294.
1967-1 CUM. BULL. 117.
55 T.C. 598 (1971).
55 T.C. 928 (1970).
55 T.C. 598, 608 (1971).
55 T.C. 928 (1970).
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outside of the controlled group as a result of a nonarm's-length
transaction between members of the group may it be reallocated
under section 482. If income from outside the group is not traceable
to the interest-free, rent-free or below-market transaction within the
group, no income exists to be reallocated under the provisions of
section 482.
In the Second Circuit decision of B. Forman Co. v. Commis54 the Service won an important victory upholding the regulasioner,
tions on interest-free loans under section 482. In Forman,two corporations each owned fifty percent of the stock of a third corporation
that had been formed to construct and operate a downtown enclosed
shopping mall adjoining the rear entrances of retail stores operated
by the parent companies. In the years under review, each of the
corporations had loaned 1,000,000 dollars to the controlled corporation interest-free. Pursuant to the section 482 regulations, the Commissioner increased the income of each controlling corporation by
five percent of the outstanding loans. The Tax Court held that
section 482 was inapplicable because neither corporation acting
alone had control of the borrower (each possessed only fifty percent
of the stock), and therefore the court did not reach the question
whether the corporations could be charged with interest income
under the regulations. Reversing the Tax Court decision, the Second
Circuit held that the control requirement of section 482 should be
broadly construed and that the control each corporation exercised
over the affairs of the borrower was sufficient for purposes of section
482. Addressing itself to the question whether the imputation of
interest income to the corporations on their interest-free loans was
proper, the court stated:
Reallocation is necessary here in order to properly reflect the income of
taxpayers and Midtown. Taxpayers have advanced an argument, supported by
case law, that the Commissioner may not create income where none actually
existed....
To the extent that the above cases cited by taxpayers may be read as
holding that no interest can be allocated under § 482 under the facts of this
case, they are not in accord with either economic reality, or with the declared
purpose of section 482. Those cases may be correct from a pure accounting
standpoint. Nevertheless, interest income may be added to taxpayers' incomes, as long as a correlative adjustment is made to Midtown, for then the
true taxable income of all involved will be properly reflected.15

The taxpayers alternatively contended that the 1,000,000 dollar
advances were not loans, but rather contributions to capital. The
54. 453 F.2d 1144 (2dCir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 899
(1972).
55. Id. at 1155-56.
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court dismissed this argument, finding that the facts clearly indicated that the advances in question were bona fide loans. Curiously,
the court did not discuss why the failure to charge interest on the
loans could not be treated as a contribution to captial. The Second
Circuit apparently rejected the Tax Court's position in earlier cases
that income resulting from the loan must be produced outside of the
controlled group before interest income may be charged to the
lender under section 482.11 It should be noted, however, that it is
possible that gross income may indeed have resulted to the borrow57 but the Second Circuit
ing corporation from the loans in Forman,
did not rest its opinion on the presence of such income.
The Tax Court recently reasserted its views on the creation of
income issue in Kerry Investment Co.58 and Kahler Corp.,59 both of
which were reversed on appeal. In Kerry, a parent company periodically advanced over 500,000 dollars to a subsidiary. Pursuant to the
section 482 regulations, the Commissioner increased the parent's
income by five percent of the loans in each of the years, allowing
correlative adjustments for interest deductions on the returns of the
subsidiary. To the extent that the parent was unable to demonstrate
that the loans had not been invested productively by the subsidiary,
the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's adjustments. When
the parent proved that no gross income had been derived from a
particular loan, however, the court held that no interest income
could be imputed to the parent on that loan. Reversing the Tax
Court's decision in part, the Ninth Circuit held the Commissioner's
allocation should be sustained regardless of the loan's production of
gross income for the subsidiary:"0
When a taxpayer lends $500,000 to a wholly owned subsidiary without
interest, it is obvious that the lender is likely divesting itself of interest income
56. Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951); Huber Homes, Inc., 55 T.C. 598 (1971);
PPG Industries, Inc., 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
57. Apparently Midtown did realize gross income, but it was not traced to the loan
proceeds. See Nauheim, B. Forman & Co., Inc.-A CrucialTest of the Future of Section 482,
26 TAX LAWYER 107, 115 n.28 (1972), citing Respondent's request for findings of fact number
34, Brief for Respondent Before the Tax Court of the United States, Docket Nos. 468-69, 46969. See also, Kerry Inv. Co., 58 T.C. 479, 490 (1972). "In B. FormanCo., Inc. v. Commissioner,
...the court upheld the respondent's determination increasing the taxpayer's income as a
result of interest-free loans which it made to a related person. The borrower had sustained a
loss during the years in issue, but the Court of Appeals seemed to indicate that § 482 could
be applied irrespective of whether the borrower had income during the year. Despite such
indication by the court, the borrower did in fact apparently receive gross income during the
year."
58. 58 T.C. 479 (1972).
59. 58 T.C. 496 (1972).
60. 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAxFs (34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 74-5065 (9th Cir. June 6, 1974).
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that it could have earned by making interest-bearing loans in a competitive
market. When such an interest-free loan is made, we see no reason why an
allocation of some income on the loan should not be made to the taxpayer even
if the interest-free loan did not result in the production of gross income. In
short, we hold that the tracing in order to determine whether the borrowed
funds generated gross income to the borrower is neither necessary nor required."
In Kahler Corp.,82 decided by the Tax Court on the same day
as Kerry, the Commissioner did not assert that loans made by a
parent to subsidiary corporations had generated gross income to the
subsidiaries. Therefore, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer need
not prove that the loans were unproductive of gross income and that
the imputation of interest income was improper. The Tax Court's
decision was reversed by the Eighth Circuit,13 which held that
whether the borrowed funds produced income to the borrowing corporations was of "no importance." 4
The authority of the section 482 regulations withstood another
recent test in the Eighth Circuit on an issue not directly involving
creation of income. In Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States, 5 the
taxpayer corporation was engaged in the consumer finance business
in several states, operating through 399 subsidiaries. Borrowing over
110,000,000 dollars at an effective interest rate of 5.55 percent, the
taxpayer reloaned these funds to its solvent subsidiaries at an interest rate of 5.75 precent while charging its insolvent subsidiaries little
or no interest. The differential in the interest charged to the solvent
and insolvent subsidiaries resulted in sufficient interest income to
the taxpayer to cover its own interest expense at the rate of 5.55
percent on the funds it had borrowed. Although the Commissioner
increased the interest income of the taxpayer by five percent of the
funds loaned to the insolvent subsidiaries, he did not reduce the 5.75
percent interest received by taxpayer from the solvent subsidiaries.
There was no question that the subsidiaries had all derived gross
income on the loans from the taxpayer since they had reloaned the
money to consumers at much higher rates of interest.
Finding that there was no distortion of the taxpayer's income,
the district court disapproved the Commissioner's adjustment because the taxpayer had recovered its borrowing costs from the group
of subsidiaries taken as a whole." The court reasoned that the Coin61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 74-5240.
58 T.C. 496 (1972).
486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1973).
Id.at 5.
7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d)
359 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Mo. 1973).

74-5020 (8th Cir. May 31, 1974).
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missioner would be justified only in making a horizontal adjustment
among the subsidiary corporations since it was their incomes alone
that had been distorted with respect to each other. On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court decision on the
ground that it made no difference whether the Commissioner first
adjusted the income of the subsidiaries or that of the parent and
that his determination would not be upset unless it was arbitrary
and capricious. 7 Since the interest charged on the loans to the solvent subsidiaries of 5.75 percent was within the regulations' "safe
haven" rates of four to six percent, no adjustment was necessary to
reduce the rate charged to the solvent subsidiaries to five percent.
Instead, the court found that increasing the interest paid by the
insolvent subsidiaries to five percent was the only adjustment
required. The net effect of the application of the regulations was the
attribution of income to the parent at a rate of interest in excess of
its own borrowing cost of 5.55 percent. Thus the parent was required
to show a net profit on the funds it had loaned to its subsidiaries as
a group on terms which were in fact only sufficient to recoup its own
borrowing cost.
The Commissioner's success in the circuit courts on the creation of income issue and the apparent validity of the regulations
under section 482 on interest-free loans raises the possibility that
the Tax Court will concede the validity of the regulations and abandon the tracing of income requirement. All of the circuit courts have
not faced the issue, however, and the Tax Court may consequently
decide to adhere to its position in cases appealable to other circuits."
The Commissioner's approach to interest-free loans between
commonly controlled corporations is mechanical at best, and it is
doubtful that imputation of interest income to the lender without a
consideration of other factors invariably produces a clear reflection
on income. Too often the only thing clearly reflected is a higher
income tax liability for the parties. An obsession with an arm'slength standard to the exclusion of all other considerations overlooks the routine manner in which nonarm's-length dealings between a parent and a subsidiary are permitted in the context of
capital contributions and dividend distributions.69 In applying sec67. 7 P-H 1974 FED. TAXES (34 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d) 74-5020, at 74-5063.
68. The Sixth Circuit took a position similar to that expressed by the Tax Court on the
creation of income issue in Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508
(6th Cir. 1940).
69. Section 118 provides that gross income does not include any contribution to the
capital of the corporation. While § 118 does not deal with the tax consequences to the
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tion 482 to interest-free loans, a number of factors, including tracing
of income from the loans involved, should be considered. An
interest-free loan of funds borrowed by the lender at interest may
require that the borrower be treated as the true borrower on the
interest-bearing loan, with a corresponding reallocation of the interest deduction to the borrower regardless of whether the interest-free
loan itself produced income. In other situations, whether the
interest-free loan has produced income outside of the group or
whether the borrower has any gross income at all may be relevant
70
considerations.
The relationship between the corporations should also be considered. If the borrower is a subsidiary of the lender, an interest-free
loan to the subsidiary might properly be treated as a contribution
to capital by the parent equal in value to the use of the money,
regardless of the production of income by the loan. If the subsidiary
invests the loan proceeds in a business it operates, no reallocation
of income should be necessary since income earned by capital furnished by a parent is not ordinarily reallocated to the parent company. When the interest-free loan has no business purpose, however,
or is invested by the subsidiary as a conduit for the parent, or when
circumstances otherwise indicate a plan to evade income taxes, reallocation under section 482 may be appropriate.
In the reverse situation, an interest-free loan from a subsidiary
to a parent company normally should be considered a dividend in
the amount of the value of the use of the money loaned. Under this
approach, the parent has the benefit of the dividend received deduction of section 243 to the extent of eighty-five percent of the dividend as it would on any other dividend distribution. Instead of
increasing the income of the subsidiary making the loan by imputing interest under section 482, the income of the parent would be
increased by fifteen percent of the value of the use of the money.
contributing shareholder, the regulations provide that such contributions represent an additional price paid for the shares of stock held by the individual shareholders. Treas. Reg. §
1.118-1 (1956). Such treatment implies that the shareholder does not recognize income on
making a contribution to the capital of the corporation, but instead increases his cost for the
shares. The increase in cost for the shares in the case of contributions of property is probably
the shareholder's basis for the property. See B. BiTrKER & J. EUSTcE, supra note 1, 3.14,
at 3-51. In the case of the contribution of the value of the use of money loaned to a corporation,
the corporation should have no increase in its basis for the stock of the subsidiary, since it
has no tax cost or basis for the benefit contributed to the subsidiary.
70. If the borrower has no gross income whatsoever, it is difficult to understand how
the Commissioner could make an allocation of income under § 482. While the circuit courts
may not require a tracing of gross income from the loan proceeds, it may be necessary that
the borrower have some gross income before an allocation may be made under § 482.
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Interest-free loans between brother-sister corporations would not, of
course, have the benefit of treatment as contributions to capital or
as dividend distributions. In some cases such loans might give rise
to constructive dividends
to the shareholders controlling the
7 1
brother-sister companies.

Nevertheless, the authority of the Commissioner to make adjustments under the existing regulations recently has been strongly
upheld .by the circuit courts. In view of those decisions, tax counsel
must consider alternatives to the interest-free loan, particularly in
the case of parent-subsidiary corporations. Often, a parent company
advances money to a financially troubled subsidiary to permit it to
continue or improve its operations. Advancing funds in the form of
an interest-free loan may seem a sensible approach since an interest
burden is not added to the financial problems of the subsidiary,
interest income is not realized by the parent, and an interest deduction is not wasted on the unprofitable subsidiary, and yet the parent
can receive repayment of its funds without income consequences.
Unfortunately, the likely result is that the Service will successfully
tax interest income to the parent under section 482. A better approach would be to have the parent advance the subsidiary the
necessary funds as a contribution to capital or in exchange for additional stock of the subsidiary.72 If the parent wished a return of its
funds from the subsidiary in the future, repayment could be accomplished through a distribution on the stock of the subsidiary, triggering dividend treatment only if the subsidiary had sufficient
earnings and profits. 73 Often a repayment distribution may be
planned before the subsidiary had generated earnings and profits.
Even if a portion of the repayment distribution is treated as a dividend, only fifteen percent of the dividend would be included in the
parent's income, an amount that might be considerably less than
five percent of the total amount advanced each year for a number
74
of years as in the case of an interest-free loan to the subsidiary.

If

71. According to the Service a reallocation under § 482 between brother-sister corporations requires that the reallocated item be treated as constructively distributed to the common shareholders and then contributed by them to the capital of the other controlled corporation. Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 CUM. BuLL. 112; Rev. Proc. 65-31 § 4.04(3), 1965-2 CuM. BULL.
1024, 1037. Under §§ 1501 & 1504, brother-sister corporations not having a common parent
corporation are not eligible to file consolidated returns. This ineligibility coupled with the
constructive dividend problem severely restricts the mobility of capital between such brothersister corporations.
72. A purchase of stock for cash would not entail recognition of gain to the parent
company, even though it did not meet the control requirements of § 351.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a).
74. Tress. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (1968) generally requires imputation of income at a rate of

19741

TAXATION OF LOANS

1105

the parent-subsidiary constitutes an "affiliated group" of corporations, it may elect to file consolidated returns prior to repayment of
the capital advanced to the subsidiary. In that case, the parent will
have the benefit of the one hundred percent dividend exclusion
provided by section 243(a)(3) for dividends received from a member
of an affiliated group filing a consolidated return. Another method
of returning needed capital to the parent would be through an
interest-free loan from the subsidiary to the parent. If the regulations were applied they could work to the advantage of the taxpayers, since the interest imputed to the subsidiary would be absorbed
in loss carryovers while the interest deduction of the parent could
be used against its income.7 5
V.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the cases and regulations just considered,
the tax consequences of interest-free loans are not clearly defined in
many respects. Those consequences that should flow from such
loans are primarily determined by the relationship of the parties.
Interest-free loans between family members not only have obvious
gift tax implications but also involve assignment of income considerations. In the corporate context, an interest-free loan by a corporation to its shareholder should be treated as a dividend distribution
of the value of the use of the money loaned, while interest-free loans
between commonly controlled corporations present difficult reallocation questions under section 482. The regulations rely solely on
the absence of an arm's-length interest rate for imputation of interest income to the lender, and the Tax Court's tracing of income
requirement has yet to find any support in those circuit courts in
which the issue has been litigated. 76 Nevertheless, the regulations
are unsatisfactory because of their failure to consider other factors
relevant to a determination whether income taxes are being evaded
or income is not being clearly reflected. Foremost among these considerations is the interrelationship of the controlled corporations
and the possibility that conventional principles of capital contribution and dividend payment should often control the tax conse5% per annum where the interest charged on the loan does not measure up to the arm's length
standard set forth in the regulation.
75. The adjustments authorized by § 482, however, may not be instituted by the taxpayer. "Section 482 grants no right to a controlled taxpayer to apply its provisions at will,
nor does it grant any right to compel the district director to apply such provisions." Treas.
Reg.§ 1.482-1(b)(3) (1962).
76. No support exists other than that reflected in the Sixth Circuit's 1940 decision in
Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
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quences of interest-free loans between parent and subidiary companies. The Service should take into account these factors, rather than
applying arbitrary rules designed simply to produce the most income tax liability.

